We evaluate the e¤ects of a fundamental lever of constitutional design: the duration of o¢ ce terms. We exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives where term lengths were assigned randomly. Results for an index as well as individual measures of legislative performance show that longer terms enhance legislative performance. A second experiment in the Argentine Senate extends results to a di¤erent chamber and time. This evidence that longer terms enhance political performance highlight limits to classic theories of electoral discipline (Barro 1973 , Ferejohn 1986 ) predicting that shorter terms, by tightening accountability, will incentivize hard work by politicians. We discuss and test possible explanations. Shorter terms appear to worsen performance not due to campaign distractions but due to an investment logic. When returns to e¤ort are not immediate, shorter terms dampen incentives to exert e¤ort.
Introduction
A fundamental problem in constitutional design is to decide for how long o¢ cials should serve before they can be replaced. In the case of democratically elected representatives the problem boils down to one of frequency of elections. One advantage to keeping term lengths short is that more frequent accountability should keep representatives on their toes, leading to better representation of voters'interests. This notion is formalized in the classic papers by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) on electoral discipline. In their models, when o¢ ce terms are made shorter politicians lose discretion, exert more e¤ort, and extract lower rents from citizens (Barro 1973, p. 30 , shows explicitly that shirking increases with the time between elections). According to these models, more frequent accountability should always make politicians work harder. But is this always the dominant force shaping political incentives?
Although this is an incentives-related question at the heart of the political agency problem, economists interested in the workings of government have paid scant attention to it.
As we discuss in the following section, the received evidence on the e¤ects of term lengthsmostly originating in political science-is not abundant and su¤ers from various identi…cation problems. This paper is a …rst attempt at measuring the e¤ects of term lengths through a natural experiment. This helps us overcome the identi…cation challenges involved as well as examine whether political incentives respond to some other force beyond accountability.
There are reasons why shortening o¢ ce terms too much in order to strengthen accountability may back…re and weaken politicians'incentives. Very frequent elections could distract politicians away from policy and towards campaigning. It is also possible that politicians may need longer time horizons in order to invest in assets speci…c to their political position.
The resulting picture is one where the frequency of elections could a¤ect various incentives at once. As a consequence, it is not obvious whether and how term lengths should matter.
Our main objective is to investigate the e¤ects of term lengths in a way that overcomes the various identi…cation di¢ culties involved. To this end we exploit two natural experiments in the Argentine legislature introducing exogenous variation in legislative term lengths. We …nd that the length of terms does matter, and that shorter terms worsen legislative performance.
A second objective of the paper is to discuss and test for possible explanations. Aided by a simple theoretical model, we derive tests to identify the mechanism by which longer terms induce a stronger legislative performance. The evidence suggests that the reason why legislators on a shorter track perform less well is not campaign distractions. Rather, longer terms appear to incentivize e¤ort by guaranteeing the receipt of returns to e¤ort over a longer span of time. In other words, legislative e¤ort follows an investment logic that overcomes the accountability pressures stemming from more frequent elections.
As an example of the identi…cation problems facing the study of term lengths, consider the substantial cross-country variation in the length of legislative terms (see Table 1 ). One could be tempted to exploit the cross-country variation in legislative term lengths to try to ascertain its e¤ects on legislative performance. However, di¤erent nations may select di¤erent term lengths because they face di¤erent incentive trade-o¤s. Because the length of terms is endogenous, exploiting the cross-country variation cannot help identify the e¤ects of longer
terms. An alternative approach would be to focus on a single legislature with staggered terms, such as the Senate of the United States, and study the e¤ects of the proximity of elections on performance. As we discuss in the following section on related literature, this avenue poses serious identi…cation problems as well.
To overcome these problems, we resort to two natural experiments in the Argentine legislature, one in the House in 1983 and one in the Senate in 2001. Our main focus is on the House of Representatives in 1983, for which we have more observations and more measures of legislative performance. On December 10 of 1983 a newly elected set of legislators took o¢ ce after a seven year dictatorship. House representatives in Argentina face no term limits and their terms are four years long. Also, the Constitution requires the staggered renewal of the House chamber by halves every two years. In order to get the staggered renewal mechanism going, half of the representatives elected in 1983 got two-year terms, and the other half got four-year terms. The allocation of two-and four-year terms in this congress of 1983 was done through a well documented random assignment. We compare the level of legislative performance of the two-year-term legislators to that of their four-year counterparts. We do this for the …rst two years of legislative activity, while both groups worked side by side. We follow Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) in that we …rst study overall e¤ects by aggregating di¤erent performance measures into an index of legislative performance. We then study the e¤ect of term lengths on the six individual measures of legislative performance that we obtained, namely attendance to ‡oor sessions, participation in ‡oor debates (measured by number of speeches), committee activity (attendance to committee sessions and participation in the production of committee bills), the number of bills each member introduced, and how many of these where approved. We …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of a longer term on the performance index as well as on four of the six metrics of performance.
We consider two main possible explanations for our results. One is that legislators on a shorter track spend part of their term campaigning. An implication of our model, and a prediction by legislators we interviewed, is that if campaigning is the driving force behind the results, then the performance di¤erential in favor of legislators with longer terms should diminish for legislators representing districts that are very close to the seat of Congress. After all, those legislators face less of a con ‡ict between campaigning and legislating. The data does not support this prediction, suggesting that campaign distractions are not a driving force behind our results. The data supports another prediction of the model: when legislators are sensitive to the time horizon because of an investment logic, legislators in safer seats, having a longer implicit time horizon, should respond less to being dealt a longer term. The idea that time horizons rather than campaigning shape legislative performance is con…rmed by our Senate data. We compare the performance of senators serving four-and six-year terms.
During the …rst two years, when none are campaigning, senators on the six-year track work harder than those on the four-year track.
As the Barro and Ferejohn models show, longer terms may entail costs in terms of relaxed accountability. But our empirical study shows that, at least while terms are fairly short, extending terms entails bene…ts in terms of measured performance. Those bene…ts do not appear to stem from a simple campaign distraction problem, but from a pure time horizon e¤ect highlighting an investment logic. When returns to e¤ort are not instantaneous, legislators are more likely to exert e¤ort tied to legislative activity when guaranteed a longer term in o¢ ce. This explanation was rated as highly plausible by the legislators we interviewed. Lastly, we show that the investment logic does not appear to work in connection with the accumulation of a generic stock of expertise that once put together renders legislators indi¤erent to the time horizon.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related literature. In Section 3 we describe the natural experiment in the House and present the data. In Section 4 we lay out the econometric model and report the results. We discuss and test possible explanations in Section 5. Section 6 reports results from the second natural experiment in the Argentine Senate. Section 7 lays out our simple theoretical model crystallizing the connection between term lengths and performance. Section 8 contains our conclusions.
Related literature
The number of empirical studies focusing on the e¤ects of term lengths is limited. A small literature has attempted to identify whether United States legislators behave di¤erently when approaching reelection, mostly in terms of their voting (but see Lott 1987 who focuses on vote participation). Amacher and Boyes (1978) exploit the staggered composition of the United States Senate and compare-for the 93rd Congress-the voting records of United States senators who di¤er in the proximity of their reelection. They …nd that senators closer to reelection vote more in line with representatives (who presumably proxy for constituency interests). Thomas (1985) tracks the voting pattern of senators in their third versus their sixth year, …nding a moderating tendency of election proximity. Kalt and Zupan (1990) also report that senators seem to alter their voting pattern when approaching reelection. Lott and Davis (1992) provide further references in this area. Their discussion emphasizes that most of the papers attempting to identify the e¤ects of electoral proximity focused on voting patterns and su¤ered from measurement and speci…cation problems.
1 It is worth noting that a study tracking legislators as they approach reelection will tend to confound the pure e¤ect of the time horizon (which would be relevant to identifying the e¤ects of term length) with those of changing political circumstances. The alternative approach of exploiting the staggered structure of the Senate to observe contemporaneous behavior by legislators 1 Lott and Davis reexamine data for United States senators and …nd that the proximity of elections does not signi…cantly a¤ect voting behavior in the United States Senate. The general consensus in the profession since then has converged on the idea that voting patterns in the Congress of the United States are largely independent from electoral pressure (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997 and Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004) .
elected at di¤erent times will tend to confound the e¤ects of the proximity of elections with those of tenure. Tenure e¤ects may involve sorting e¤ects and changes in legislators'political capital. Even if one can control for tenure, focusing on legislators elected at di¤erent points in time introduces unobserved heterogeneity. For example, the electoral promises made in separate years could di¤er, and so may the extent to which legislators feel they can depart from the implicit electoral contract. Ideally, one would want to observe legislators appointed at the exact same time, who di¤er only in the term length they are assigned. This is what our design provides, therefore avoiding the aforementioned identi…cation problems.
Crain and Tollison (1977) consider governorships as investment projects for politicians and compare campaign expenditures across races for two-versus four-year positions. They …nd that expenditures are larger when campaigning for a four-year governorship than along two consecutive campaigns for two-year governorships. These results are consistent with the direction and logic behind ours, although one cannot rule out the possibility that their results may re ‡ect selection forces. Our study rules out selection e¤ects given that the random assignment of terms occurred after legislators had been elected. Recently, Titiunik (2008) adopted an approach similar to ours to study the e¤ects of randomly assigned term lengths on abstention rates and bills introduced by state senators in Arkansas and Texas.
The direction of her results corroborates those we found.
A much larger literature has analyzed the e¤ects of term limits. 2 Term-limit restrictions are interesting per se, but they pose a di¤erent problem to that of term lengths. To be sure, holding constant term lengths, the imposition of term limits should tend to reduce the time horizon in o¢ ce. But term limits also introduce a lame duck period and associated e¤ects stemming from the anticipation of that last period. 3 Term lengths, in contrast, a¤ect the time horizon without introducing last period e¤ects.
Our work is more broadly related to the study of legislative performance. Schiller (1995) 2 The work in that area has focused intensely on consequences for turnover (see the papers in the edited volume by Grofman 1996, and also Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000) and the level of expertise in the legislature. Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) uses the number of bills sponsored by a legislator to measure performance and …nds that senior senators sponsor more bills than junior members. She also reports a higher performance for senators that hold committee chairs or are chairs of a large number of subcommittees.
Similar results are reported in Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson (1983) for a few state legislatures in the United States. Padró i Miquel and Snyder (2006) use subjective measures of legislative performance in the House of representatives of North Carolina to explore the e¤ects of legislative tenure. They …nd that the performance of legislators increases with tenure, and they consider learning by doing as a possible explanation. Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that higher wages improve the performance of city council members in Brazil (they also identify selection improvements). Our focus is complementary by holding wages constant and varying an institutional feature that a¤ects performance.
A small number of theoretical contributions highlight di¤erent implications of extending terms. As mentioned earlier, the classic works by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) yields a picture where more frequent elections always yield stronger incentives. Contrary to this view, our results suggest that over some temporal range it is possible to space out elections, thus saving on electoral costs, while at the same time enhancing incentives for legislative performance. This of course does not imply that inde…nitely lengthening terms will continue to have the same e¤ect. Maskin and Tirole (2004) study the relative convenience of subjecting a politician to reelection or insulating her from that pressure-thus turning her into a "judge."
The optimal choice depends on how eager the politician is to be reelected as this determines the likelihood that reelection concerns may distort policy choices. Schultz (2008) considers a model where representatives have private information and must make policy decisions with an eye towards getting reelected. In his model the degree of partisan polarization and the severity of uncertainty interact to make both short and long terms potentially optimal depending on the prevailing parameter con…guration.
3 Natural experiment and data
The natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives
Argentina is a federal republic consisting of twenty four legislative districts: twenty three provinces and an autonomous federal district. The National Congress has two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies (i.e., the House) and the Senate. 4 At the time of the return to democracy in December 1983, all 254 deputies were elected at the same time, starting their terms on December 10, 1983. In Argentina deputies have four-year terms and the Constitution requires the renewal of half the chamber every two years. In order to get the staggered renewal mechanism going it was necessary to allocate half of the representatives elected in 1983 to two-year terms. The allocation of two-and four-year terms in this foundational
Congress was done through random assignment.
In order to assign terms, the 254 representatives were …rst divided into two groups of 127 representatives each. The allocation of individual legislators into groups 1 and 2 was done at the level of the party-province delegation, which implies that all province districts and political parties were, whenever possible, proportionally represented in each group (see Table 2 ). The procedure for the random allocation of terms, set by the Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria (the equivalent of the Rules committee in the United States) involved dividing the representatives in two groups of equal size, Group 1 and Group 2. Each party-province delegation apportioned an equal number of its members to each group. 5 In the case that a party had an odd number of representatives from one province the imbalance was corrected with the analogous surplus from another province where the party also had an odd number of representatives. During a public legislative session on January 20 of 1984, the Secretario Parlamentario jointly with a representative from each party performed the lottery draw, which gave legislators in Group 1 a four year term and legislators in Group 2 a two year term.
At the point when legislators were assigned to groups 1 and 2 the party-province delegations did not know which group would get assigned the long term. One could be concerned that if delegations systematically assigned the better legislators to one particular group then the assignment of term lengths would not be e¤ectively exogenous. But behind a veil of ignorance there would be no reason for risk averse legislators to introduce any imbalance, so we do not see this aspect of the design as problematic. In fact, all observable legislator characteristics are balanced between the two-and the four-year term groups.
As shown in Table 3 , there are no statistically signi…cant di¤erences in observables across the two groups of legislators, suggesting that the randomization was successful in ensuring orthogonality between covariates and term assignment. Moreover, the majority of partyprovince delegations (75%) did the assignment in a way that was essentially random. They assigned legislators occupying an odd-numbered position in the 1983 electoral party list to one group, and those occupying an even-numbered position to the other. Positions in the ticket (i.e., whether a legislator is close to the top or not) depend largely on the demographics of the province area to which the legislator belongs. A second order factor that a¤ects list positions is the perceived popularity of the candidate in her area. Thus, whether a legislator is …rst or tenth in her party list is not random, but whether she falls in an even-or oddnumbered position is. The remaining 25% of the delegations did not follow the odd vs.
even slot procedure to assign legislators to groups, but by all observable measures their assignment appears random as well. As shown in the results section, our …ndings are robust to eliminating from the sample the representatives in these delegations and to clustering standard errors at the party-province level. The experiment in the Senate, described in detail in Section 6, is simpler. Each province has three senators, and each provincial delegation to the senate was randomly assigned a two-, four-, or six-year term.
Data and measures of performance
Our dataset contains yearly information on individual performance and legislator characteristics for the two-year period starting in December 1983 and ending on December 1985. Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the six measures we use. The two measures that are most highly correlated are committee attendance and the number of committee bills signed (correlation coe¢ cient equal to 0:49). Attendance to ‡oor sessions and committee sessions, which one would expect to be very strongly correlated, display a correlation of 0:39.
But most correlations are much weaker and in some cases negative. Overall, we conclude that these measures hold separate interest as proxies of legislative performance.
It is di¢ cult to rank these measures in terms of which ones do the best job at capturing legislative activity. The legislators we interviewed held the view that the various metrics capture di¤erent aspects of a legislator's performance, and that this is useful given that di¤erent legislators cultivate di¤erent pro…les. Some legislators may be very active at introducing bills and seeking to capture the attention of constituents. This will be captured by the measure of bills introduced. Other legislators may care about actually a¤ecting policy, so they may introduce fewer bills but get a higher share of them approved. This recommends utilizing the measure of bills approved as a separate proxy for legislative e¤ectiveness. Another focus for legislators may be not on authoring bills but on pushing the party agenda through committee work, bipartisan negotiations, or by voicing party positions. The latter tasks may in turn attract di¤erent types of politician. Those with an ability for drafting legislation will tend to get involved in more painstaking work within committee (proxied by committe work measures), while those with a talent for rhetorics will be more active as ‡oor speakers (proxied by speeches given).
Is ‡oor attendance relevant? One might argue that even a relatively unproductive legislator may display high attendance. However, attendance may re ‡ect general involvement with the daily legislative business.
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For the reasons exposed here and the feedback from legislators, we believe the metrics available to us, while noisy, do proxy for di¤erent and relevant dimensions of legislative performance. The legislators we interviewed thought that ‡oor speaking is perhaps the metric that is least correlated with e¤ort. They conjectured that ‡oor speaking would be mostly associated with being a legislator of a certain "type."In particular, frequent speakers would be those whom the party trusts to do a good rhetorical job, those who happen to occupy positions of leadership, and those belonging to a small block. Given that every party gets at least one speech slot per debate, members of smaller blocks would get to speak more often. As we discuss in the results section, these observations of the legislators are corroborated by the data.
In order to draw general conclusions in a context of multiple outcomes, we construct an index of legislative performance that aggregates the six objective measures of legislative performance described above. To construct the index of legislative performance we follow the procedure used in Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) . The index is de…ned to be the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components, where the z-scores are calculated by subtracting the mean of two-year term legislators and then dividing by the standard deviation of two-year term legislators. Notice that in all cases higher performance measures have higher z-scores. In the results section we also present estimates for each separate outcome.
The variable of interest is Four-year term, an indicator variable that takes the value of one for those legislators which were randomly assigned to an initial four-year term and zero otherwise. The database also includes a number of legislator characteristics, such as age (as of November 1983), male (a dummy variable that takes the value of one for male legislators), legislative inexperience at the national level (a dummy variable that takes the value of one for freshmen), being a lawyer (a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the legislator is a lawyer), holding a university degree (a dummy variable that takes the value of one for legislators with a university degree that are not lawyers), leadership (a dummy variable that takes the value of one for legislators that are president of the chamber, chair of a committee, and majority or minority leader), belonging to the majority party (a dummy variable that takes the value of one for members of the majority party), belonging to a small block (a dummy taking the value of one for legislators belonging to a block containing less than four legislators), the distance in kilometers from the capital of the legislator's province to Buenos
Aires, and a set of dummy variables for province. candidates running for all the seats corresponding to the province of Santa Fe. But given the party's vote share and the proportional representation system, only the top 10 members were seated. Those legislators close to the 10th position in the ticket faced risk going forward,
given that the party's electoral strength might erode, and that the legislator's ranking in a future party list depends largely on relatively permanent factors, such as the demographics of the legislator's home area. We develop a dummy variable to capture electoral safety in the following way: we will say a legislator is relatively safe if she entered Congress within the top half of her delegation (in our example, in the top 5 slots), and that she is relatively at risk otherwise. In this spirit, we de…ne a dummy variable called Slackness that is equal to one whenever the legislator placed in the upper half of the party-province delegation, and 7 The legislative district is de…ned at the province level even if legislators may be informally linked to a home are within the province. 8 Since the return to democracy in 1983 the two dominant political parties in Argentina have been the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical party) and the Partido Justicialista (Peronist party). In the period under analysis the majority party was the Unión Cívica Radical.
that is equal to zero otherwise.
Econometric model and results
Given random assignment, the impact of serving an initial four-year term relative to serving an initial two-year term can be estimated by using the following regression model:
where Y it is any of the performance measures under study for legislator i in period t (where 1984; 1985 , the two years following the assignment), is the parameter of interest, X i is a matrix of legislator characteristics, t is a time e¤ect, and " it is the error term. Table 5 reports estimates of the impact of serving a four-year term relative to a two-year term on the overall index of legislative performance elaborated following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) . 9 Results with and without controls indicate that legislators serving a four-year term display better performance that those serving a two-year term and that the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant. The size of this overall e¤ect of changing the term length from two to four years is, taking the two-year legislators as baseline, about a …fth of a standard deviation.
The fact that a longer term increases the index of overall performance may be the result of di¤erent patterns of e¤ects over the individual performance measures. To determine whether the e¤ects are wide-ranging or concentrated on just one or two outcomes, we investigate next the e¤ects on individual performance metrics.
In Table 6 we report estimates for the six separate metrics of performance. This analysis reveals that the e¤ects of longer terms are not concentrated in one outcome or two. The point estimate of a longer term in o¢ ce is positive for all six metrics and statistically signi…cant for four of the six. Moreover, the di¤erences in performance tend to be important in size. 10 9 A typical concern when conducting inference for the estimated parameters of Equation 1 is that the errors for the same legislator might not be independent. To address this concern, aside from usual Huber-White robust standard errors, we report robust standard errors clustered at the legislator level. 10 The variables committee bills, ‡oor speeches, bills introduced, and bills rati…ed take discrete values and are strongly skewed to the right with many observations at zero; consequently, ordinary least squares Getting a longer term appears to signi…cantly increase performance on ‡oor attendance by 3% (relative to the mean of the two-year legislators). Committee attendance is about 12%
higher for long term legislators, and the number of committee bills bearing the legislator's signature goes up by 14% in the uncontrolled regression, and by 19% in the controlled one. Floor speaking appears to respond to a longer term -the point estimates indicate an increase of 30% in the uncontrolled regression and a lower 13% in the regression with controls. Estimates of the control variables (not shown but available from the authors upon request) reveal that the opinions of legislators on the determinants of ‡oor speaking were on target. In their view, ‡oor speaking is more a re ‡ection of type than of e¤ort. Legislators predicted that ‡oor speaking would be associated …rst and foremost with belonging to a small block. Indeed, this appears to be the strongest determinant of the frequency of ‡oor speaking. They also indicated that occupying a leadership position or being a good orator would be associated with participating in ‡oor debates. They were right on this count as well. A leadership position is a strong predictor of ‡oor speaking. We do not have a direct measure of oratory skills, but one would imagine that holding a university degree or being a lawyer is correlated with debating abilities. These variables are indeed strongly related to speech giving. The legislators we interviewed indicated that representatives from remote districts face more of a challenge at maintaining a presence both in their districts and in the legislature. Indeed, performance measures are negatively, and for the most part very signi…cantly, impacted when a legislator represents a district that is far away from Buenos Aires.
The idea that longer terms increase performance also appears to be backed by the measures of "bill production." The point estimates in columns (9) and (10) in Table 6 indicate that the number of bills introduced goes up by 14% and 20% respectively in the uncontrolled and controlled models. These estimates, however, are only marginally signi…cant in the unclustered regression. When we switch attention from the "volume" measure of bill production to the "legislative e¢ cacy" measure, namely the number of bills that pass, the estimation would be inappropriate. In all these models we were able to reject the hypothesis that the dispersion parameter is equal to zero according to a likelihood-ratio test, a result that suggests that the correct speci…cation is a negative binomial model for count data as adopted here.
estimates become strongly signi…cant. The point estimates (see columns (11) and (12) in Table 6 ) indicate that moving from a two-to a four-year term increases the number of passed bills by around a 100%. 11 Overall, the results indicate a strong tendency for longer terms to increase legislative performance.
Robustness checks
To further validate our results, in Table 7 we report additional estimations under a wide range of alternative speci…cations and samples.
First, the signi…cance of the term length variable is not a¤ected when we cluster standard errors at the district level, or according to party-district combinations.
Second, all conclusions remain unchanged when we restrict the sample to those party province delegations that used the even/odd rule in order to assign legislators into the two groups, and when, in addition, we also exclude the …rst two legislators in the party list (we take this extra step because the di¤erence between occupying an even vs. odd position is generally random but one could argue this may not apply to the top 1 position in the party list).
Third, we run separate regressions for the two main parties at that time in order to explore possible heterogeneity in the e¤ect of term lengths according to political party. Despite the smaller sample size, we still …nd a positive and signi…cant association between term length and legislative performance for legislators of both parties, while the e¤ect is stronger for
Peronists.
Finally, the value and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of interest remain unchanged when we exclude from the sample those legislators that were leaders of the chamber or those few 11 Together with the number of committee bills signed, our main measures of pure legislative output are the number of bills each member introduced, and how many of these passed. We explore an alternative de…nition that considers not only the bills a legislator introduced but also those that she endorsed. Under the alternative de…nition the coe¢ cient for bills introduced is similar to the one obtained previously. The coe¢ cient for bills rati…ed is smaller, but the magnitude of the e¤ect is still important (moving from a twoto a four-year term increases the number of bills approved by around 45%). The signi…cance levels remain unchanged for both variables.
legislators that changed leader status during the sample period. 
Potential concerns
Even when our study relies on a well documented randomization, one can still harbor some potential concerns regarding the exogeneity and nature of the treatment. First, it could be the case that after the random assignment was done, re-optimizations took place that might have a¤ected performance for reasons other than the change in term length. For example, it could be that after terms were allocated legislators given a four-year term obtained better committee assignments or more important positions in the committees they belonged to.
Thus, in the presence of hierarchical re-optimization the conclusion that lengthening terms is a good idea would not follow if such extension were to bene…t all legislators. Our experiment is quite unique in that it is well documented that all committee assignments, leadership positions, and placement along the internal hierarchy of the chamber were decided before the assignment of terms was done. Very few re-allocations are observed after the random assignment, and they are orthogonal to the term length assignment. Table 7 ).
Second, it could be that the outcome of the lottery directly a¤ects the morale of legislators, boosting the spirits of those who got a four-year term, and depressing the rest. In this case, the instrument would not be a¤ecting behavior through its e¤ect on the term length, but directly through its "win or loss"meaning. According to the literature in experimental psychology (see for instance Amsel, 1992) , an implication of the frustration hypothesis is that we should observe an immediate drop in the performance of legislators allocated to 12 We experimented with di¤erent de…nitions of leaderhip and always found similar results.
two-year terms, followed by a graduate increase of performance as frustration gets diluted over time. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the performance di¤erential across groups on a monthly basis. We show this for the four measures for which our data allowed such disaggregation (these plots obviate months where the legislature did not register activity). Although there is no rough and ready de…nition of exactly how long frustration e¤ects should last, it is
understood that if present they should a¤ect only very few months after the randomization and then disappear. As Figure 1 shows, the higher performance of four-year legislators is not particularly correlated with the …rst few months.
Possible explanations
In this section we discuss informally and test empirically two possible explanations for the results we have found. Our discussion here makes reference to a simple theoretical model presented in Section 7 that encompasses both explanations.
Campaigning
A …rst possible explanation for the positive impact of term length on performance is that legislators with shorter terms may get distracted when campaigning for reelection. The legislators we interviewed pointed out that campaign obligations arrive over time as reelection nears, and that distance to one's constituents determines the degree of tension between legislative work and campaign obligations. Legislators representing remote provinces have to travel far in order to campaign, and therefore …nd it harder to keep up their legislative performance. Thus, if campaigning is the reason why two-year legislators performed less well in Congress, their performance de…cit should be larger when they represent distant districts. This suggests, intuitively, that we should explore an econometric speci…cation with an interaction term between the treatment variable and distance from Buenos Aires to the legislator's province.
Our simple model in Section 7 justi…es such a speci…cation. Our model shows how longer terms could foster legislative performance either because of a campaig rationale or because a time-horizon rationale (to be discussed shortly), or both. The model shows how the campaigning hypothesis being true implies that distance ampli…es the comparative static e¤ect of term length on legislative performance. Therefore, we explore the campaign hypothesis by estimating a speci…cation including an interaction term between receiving the long term assignment and the distance from Buenos Aires to the legislator's province. The result is reported in column (1) of Table 8 . The distance interaction has the wrong sign and is far from signi…cant, not allowing us to reject the null hypothesis that campaign distractions play no role driving the results presented in the previous section. Replacing the distance variable with a dummy for legislators that are not from Buenos Aires does not help the campaigning hypothesis either.
It seems prima facie counter-intuitive that campaigning, being a time-demanding activity,
would not appear to di¤erentially damage the short-term legislators. But, as was pointed out by the legislators we interviewed, given the party list system campaigning in Argentina is to a great extent a team e¤ort at the party level. Legislators that are not running for o¢ ce often campaign alongside those who are.
Time horizon e¤ects and the investment logic
The second broad explanation for the result that longer terms enhance legislative performance is that the time horizon directly a¤ects legislators' incentives. In a world where legislative activity is instantaneous in the sense that every unit of e¤ort brings its reward immediately, legislators could have great incentives to exert e¤ort even if their terms were short. But in a world where e¤ort brings non-immediate rewards, e¤ort decisions represent an investment and hence time horizons will be relevant. As formalized in our model in Section 7, one can see every unit of e¤ort as an investment project triggering a stream of returns that accrue to a legislator in o¢ ce. Given a maturity structure for those returns, longer terms are more likely to allow a legislator to recoup the costs of e¤ort.
Is legislative activity compatible with the idea that some units of e¤ort may yield returns that are relatively distant in time? In our view the answer is yes. In the case of e¤ort going into authoring a bill, the mean time lag since the introduction of a bill to its approval was, in our sample period, of 327 days, even abstracting from the time spent preparing the bill.
Also, a legislator will often have to decide whether to spend time absorbing information that will be useful while a given policy issue remains current, which may be a few years.
In the case of costs incurred to improve one's productivity (or lower one's variable costs of legislative involvement), note that some investments may be slow to amortize. A legislator may buy an apartment close to the legislature in order to lower her future costs of attending meetings, or shut down her private law …rm in order not to have a second activity competing for her time and attention. Shorter-term legislators may decide not to incur these costs.
A second question on the plausibility of the time horizon/investment explanation is whether a change from a two-to a four-year term could signi…cantly a¤ect the e¤ective time horizon facing legislators. The answer is yes because of the low reelection rates in
Argentina. This rate was of 25% for our sample of legislators.
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As shown in Section 7, the time horizon hypothesis yields an implication we can take to the data: legislators who are electorally safer should care less about the term length they get. In one extreme, term length does not a¤ect the expected time in o¢ ce for someone whose reelection is guaranteed. In the other extreme, the term length a¤ects one for one the expected tenure of someone who is certain not to be reelected. As a result, if safer legislators care less about term length, an interaction variable between being safer and getting the four-year term should be negative.
The variable capturing electoral safety is the variable "Slackness" introduced in Section 3. In column (2) in Table 8 we report results indicating that the interaction of the Fouryear term variable and the electoral safety measure is indeed negative and is statistically signi…cant. Being electorally safe appears to undo a substantial portion of the e¤ect of being dealt a longer term.
These results support the idea that the e¤ect of term length is to enhance legislative performance because of its impact on the time horizon facing legislators. 
Intertemporal cooperation and social norms
There is an alternative investment logic story that is not exclusively focused on individual incentives and incorporates collective considerations. It is possibble that legislators may "invest"by working hard early in their terms in order to be allowed to shirk later, as part of a repeated game equilibrium where shirking early would trigger a collective reversion to shirking. There are two di¤erent models one can write that capture this story. 14 First consider a cohort of in…nitely lived legislators elected for a single period but who can be reelected for ever. 15 Legislation is seen as a voluntary contribution game. Legislators may contribute low, medium, or high levels of e¤ort. E¤ort is privately costly but legislative output is collectively bene…cial, so each legislator would rather shirk and have others contribute. It is possible to characterize conditions involving the reelection probability (which acts as a discount factor), the costs of e¤ort, and the returns to legislation, such that legislators cannot sustain high levels of cooperation when their terms last for a single period. At the same time, it is possible to characterize conditions such that legislators with two-period terms will be able to sustain an equilibrium where they cooperate at high levels during the …rst half of their terms, while allowing themselves to cooperate at medium levels during the second half.
This pro…le is sustained by the threat of reverting to low cooperation if anyone deviates. In this model, extending term lengths from one to two periods allows stronger cooperation and higher performance.
Closer to the case of the Argentine legislature with its staggered renewal structure, consider next a version of the same game with overlapping cohorts of in…nitely lived legislators.
It is again possible to characterize conditions under which the extension of term lengths will make stronger cooperation possible. As a result, the fact that the empirical e¤ects we identify could be driven by social norms pinning down equilibria in repeated games does not necessarily change the policy implications. In these models longer terms allow for more 14 The two models we describe next are available upon request. 15 The models described below are related to that by Dickson and Shepsle (2001) . They o¤er an interesting treatment with overlapping generations of …nitely lived players. We focus on in…nitely lived players in order to abstract from the last period issues and better capture the Argentine context, where term limits are not present.
cooperation with and without overlapping generations of players. The only exception occurs in the case where we assume that the legislature has a …xed amount of work to do, and the social norm simply allocates it unevenly, having legislators who are farther from reelection bear a larger share of the burden. This asymmetry could result directly from the staggered structure of the chamber regardless of the length of terms. It is however di¢ cult to imagine why legislators would prefer lopsided e¤ort allocations if overall productivity is …xed and they do not care about time horizons. In such a situation both discounting motives and a desire to smooth e¤ort over time (which arises under any convexity in the cost of e¤ort)
would create a strict preference against lopsided allocations. The latter are hard to justify without a cooperation argument like the one discussed above, which is itself an investment argument.
Our data does not allow a conclusive test rejecting an explanation relying on social norms with or without an investment aspect. But on top of the theoretical reasons just outlined, we have two more reasons to be con…dent that such mechanisms are absent from the Argentine context. First, the e¤ects we identify appear sensitive to legislators'e¤ective time horizon (i.e., the degree of electoral safety matters). This indicates that a social norm tied to the term length cannot be the whole explanation. 16 Secondly, we consulted legislators for their interpretation of the results. They spontaneously suggested the possibility that the time horizon may a¤ect the calculus of individual legislators, as well as the possibility that campaign distractions might matter. The legislators we talked to considered very implausible that intertemporal cooperation agreements could shape levels of performance in the Argentine context. (This is sensible given the low reelection rates in Argentina, but could be plausible in other contexts.) Their view was that there are many degrees of freedom in the individual choice of involvement by legislators, and that these choices could be a¤ected by the time horizon facing them. 16 To be sure, one could still construct a game where players condition on the e¤ective time horizon, rather than on the remainder of one's term. However, given the likely lack of common knowledge on the e¤ective time horizon facing di¤erent individuals, such an equilibrium is highly implausible. As a result of a constitutional reform in 1994, the whole Senate needed to be renewed in 2001, when the body's 71 senators were elected at the same time to start their terms on December 10. 17 The modi…cation of term lengths and renewal rates required that some senators be assigned two-year terms, others four-year terms, and others six-year terms. The allocation was done through a well documented random assignment during a public legislative session on December 12 of 2001. The random assignment was performed at the district (i.e., province) level. All three senators from each province were jointly and randomly placed on a two-, four-, or six-year track. One implication of this design is we cannot use province dummies, although we can control for distance.
To keep with the House experiment where the short term legislators were on a two-year track, we will begin by comparing senators in the two-year track with all others (in the fourand six-year tracks). Table 9 shows the summary statistics, showing that the predetermined observables are balanced. The only one observable that shows a signi…cant di¤erence between the two and four + six year groups is distance, which is not an individual but a delegation characteristic. When looking at ten observables over two di¤erent experiments, it is likely that one will be signi…cantly di¤erent due to chance. and the number of bills that, having been introduced by each legislator, were also approved.
We have no information on committee activity and on-the- ‡oor activity due to lack of records. We de…ne the Long term variable as a dummy taking the value one if the senator got a four-or six-year term, and the value zero if the legislator got a two-year term. Again, in order to draw general conclusions in a context of multiple outcomes we use an index of legislative performance.
In columns (1) and (2) in Table 10 we show results with and without controls for the Senate. These results on the index of legislative performance broadly con…rm the picture emerging from the experiment in the House: longer terms enhance legislative productivity.
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Delving into the individual metrics of performance (regression results not reported but available upon request), we …nd that the change of receiving a longer term (four or six years)
over the mean performance of the two-year senators is of 2% for ‡oor attendance, 49% for the number of bills introduced, and 27% for the number of bills passed. These percentages are, respectively, 3, 43, and 39 in the uncontrolled regressions (these …gures can be recovered from Table 9 ). As shown in Table 9 , only one of theses di¤erences is signi…cant, suggesting that most of the e¤ect in the index regression reported in Table 10 is driven by the number of bills introduced. One should be careful not to downplay the evidence on the other two metrics, however, given that the di¤erences in all three metrics go in favor of the long-term legislators, which is informative. In the case of attendance, the size of the di¤erence between the short-and long-term senators is similar to the one found in the House, and in the case of bills passed the size of the e¤ect is large, if imprecisely estimated.
The experiment in the Senate also allows us to revisit the problem of what explains the e¤ects of longer terms. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 we provide an additional test 18 One of these legislators resigned before the random allocation. Of the other …ve legislators two were allocated to a two-year term, two were allocated to a four-year term, and one to a six-year term. 19 When we consider three treatments categories (two-, four-, and six-year terms) we …nd that the point estimate of being assigned to a four-year term is possitive but smaller to the one associated to being assigned to a six-year term. In other words, e¤ects appear to get stronger the longer the term assigned.
for the campaigning hypothesis. We exclude from the sample all senators in the two-year track, keeping only those in the four-and six-year tracks, and we also rede…ne the Long term variable to take the value of one for six-year senators and zero for the four-year ones. In this speci…cation, results tend to favor the view that six-year legislators perform better than four-year legislators during the …rst two years of their tenures. At that early stage in their tenures campaigning considerations are absent in Argentine politics. The fact that those legislators in the longer track perform better so far in advance further backs the idea that the time horizon shapes incentives before campaigning becomes an issue. This reinforces the idea that an investment logic is at play.
Lastly, we enquire about the nature of the potential investments involved in legislative activity. This is useful from the perspective of the optimal design of terms. One possibility is that the investments made by legislators accumulate in a stock of expertise or advantage that can be carried forward, and that once accumulated renders legislators unresponsive to term lengths. This would be the case for instance if term lengths a¤ected performance because they foster learning by doing about generic legislative aspects. Another possibility is that investments re ‡ect continuing and diverse opportunities that legislators never cease to be interested in, provided they can be con…dent about repayment. If the …rst possibility were true, the investment logic would be relevant at relatively early stages of a legislator's career. Then it could be optimal to allow inexperienced legislators a long …rst term in order to incentivize learning and initial investments, but it would be desirable to have more senior legislators face shorter terms in order to bene…t from stronger accountability. If the second possibility were true, term lengths could be determined without regard to seniority (which is the case in reality). In order to explore what type of investment predominates, we ask whether the e¤ects of term lengths are stronger for inexperienced legislators. In columns (5) and (6) would expect the interaction between Freshman and the Long term variable to be positive and signi…cant. We …nd that the interaction e¤ect between Freshman and tenure is not signi…cant and that it has the incorrect sign in the model with controls. 20 We conclude that investments either depreciate after a few years, or are related to varied and continuing opportunities that are also valuable for experienced legislators. As a result, nothing indicates that term lengths should be determined with regard to seniority, since the bene…ts of longer terms appear to accrue to experienced legislators too.
A simple model
In this section we present a very simple model that crystallizes the intuition why term lengths might have e¤ects on e¤ort and performance by altering the time horizon in o¢ ce. Also, the model helps characterize tests that can help isolate an explanation for our main empirical results. In our model e¤ort and performance are positively related, so to the e¤ects of hypothesis testing and interpretation it is not very important whether the dependent variables in our empirical study are thought to proxy one or the other.
Environment and returns to e¤ort
A politician enters o¢ ce in period t = 1 to serve his …rst term; calendar periods are indexed with t = 1; 2; :::, while legislative terms are indexed with i = 1; 2; ::: The politician must decide how much e¤ort e to exert during her …rst term. Assume for simplicity that e¤ort is exerted at the very start of the term (computations are similar for any calendar period within a term, so shifting or adding e¤ort instances only complicates algebra without adding insight).
To capture in the simplest possible way the fact that the time horizon might matter, the stream of returns to a unit of e¤ort exerted in t = 1 can take two forms. In a state when streams are "long" (a state indicateed with H = 1) a unit of e¤ort yields a unit return in each calendar period t 1 in terms of policy achievements, legacy building, etc., for as long as the politician remains in o¢ ce. In a state when streams are "short" (which we indicate 20 We tested this hypothesis using our data from the House experiment, and found no support for it, just as with the Senate data. The House data, however, is less suitable for the test than the one from the Senate because the House members in our dataset entered Congress in 1983, after a long dictatorship. As a result, only a handful of them had previous legislative experience, and the test is not very powerful.
with H = 0) a unit of e¤ort yields a unit return for exactly h periods. We assume the returns are deterministic but it is simple to add uncertainty. Moreover, the politician discounts the future according to the factor 2 (0; 1). Suppose also that a legislator expects to be reelected with probability p ( ; ), which depends positively on the electoral safety parameter and on the overall amount of electoral e¤ort exerted during the term preceding the election. In principle it is possible to make reelection probabilities change over time, but given our focus doing so does not yield additional insight, so we assume the probability of reelection is a stationary function. The parameter tracks legislator characteristics such as the demographics of the legislator's district: coming from a populous district within a province dictates a higher position in the party list.
A legislator faces a …rst term length of calendar periods (where may change depending on treatment) and, if reelected, a future of in…nitely many terms each of length T . As a result of the assumptions above, the politician perceives an expected stream of returns to a unit of e¤ort exerted at the start of the …rst term equal to, This stream can be re-written as,
The time horizon hypothesis entails (besides > 0) that H > 0, so legislators care about the number of calendar periods in their …rst term.
Costs of legislative and electoral e¤ort
Legislative e¤ort e is costly to the politician according to the function c (e) = ( ) (e + ( ) ) 2 :
The term ( ) implies the cost function may di¤er for legislators with di¤erent electoral safety . We are agnostic as to whether a higher raises or decreases costs of e¤ort -that is, the function may be positively or negatively sloped. 21 Finally, the cost of e¤ort depends also on the amount of electoral e¤ort ( ) expended in the same calendar period. We assume that the electoral schedule imposes campaigning obligations such that by the end of the term the legislator has contributed the required e¤ort . This electoral e¤ort is defrayed over time within the term. At the beginning of a term of length the politician must exert an amount of electoral e¤ort ( ), and the impact on costs is larger if the legislator represents a more distant province-distance is proxied by 2 [0; 1]. If campaign obligations increase with proximity to the election, then we have 0 ( ) < 0, i.e., legislators at the beginning of a longer term have fewer electoral commitments. The inequality 0 ( ) < 0 constitutes the campaigning hypothesis.
The problem of the legislator
The politician cares linearly about expected returns to political e¤ort and about e¤ort costs. Thus, using (2) and (3) an amount of e¤ort e exerted at the start of the …rst term yields expected payo¤,
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V (e) = e
The politician chooses e¤ort e to maximize V (e). The …rst order condition is,
from where we can solve for equilibrium legislative e¤ort,
Comparative statics: treatment e¤ect, and testable hypothesis to distinguish alternative explanations The key question is whether longer terms will increase or decrease e¤ort. The comparative static e¤ect of term length on e¤ort e -the theoretical correlate of the empirical treatment e¤ect-is,
Note that
is guaranteed to be positive whenever 0 ( ) is not too positive and H = 1. That means that longer term lengths will increase legislative e¤ort due to possibly two di¤erent e¤ects: (i) the time horizon hypothesis: given H > 0, a longer term guarantees a longer time to reap the rewards of legislative e¤ort (given by the …rst term
, or (ii) because a legislator is busier with electoral commitments as the election draws nearer (given by the second term 0 ( ), which is also positive whenever 0 ( ) < 0 ).
Next, we identify tests to detect whether one or both of these forces are at play in our empirical results.
Testing the campaign hypothesis. We study the e¤ect of distance on the treatment e¤ect of term length on legislative e¤ort:
This means that if the campaign hypothesis is true ( 0 < 0), then the treatment e¤ect of a longer term must get larger for legislators representing more distant districts. As discussed in Section 5 and shown in column (1) of Table 8 , this prediction is rejected by the data. In our model this means that 0 = 0.
Given expression (5), the fact that there is a treatment e¤ect and that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no campaign e¤ects ( 0 = 0), it follows that H must be positive -in other words, the time-horizon hypothesis must be true. However, we would like to …nd a more direct test that can corroborate this conclusion.
Testing the time horizon hypothesis. We …rst indicate what would be an intuitive although on its own inappropriate test of the time horizon hypothesis. One might imagine that legislators who are electorally safer (higher ) may work more because their implicit time horizon in o¢ ce is longer due to their higher reelection probability. It is easy to check that the comparative static e¤ect of on e , however, is ambiguous. In particular, if 0 > 0 implying safer legislators have a higher opportunity cost for their time, safer legislators may work less. Table 5 shows that there is no signi…cant e¤ect of slackness-our proxy for electoral safety-on legislative performance (the point estimates are in fact negative), suggesting that is positively sloped.
Armed with this information, we can now derive a test of the time-horizon hypothesis.
We study the e¤ect of electoral safety on the treatment e¤ect of term length on legislative e¤ort:
Under H = 0 for all 0 ( ) we have Table 8 , further validating the idea that the treatment e¤ects are driven by the change in the time-horizon.
Conclusion
We present a study of the e¤ects of term length on the performance of politicians. The length of terms is a fundamental spring in constitutional design. To the best of our knowledge this is the …rst investigation of the e¤ects of such institution relying on natural experiments. We begin by studying the impact of randomly assigned term lengths on the legislative performance In this paper we also take steps not just to investigate whether term lengths matter and in which direction, but also to gain insight on how they matter. One possibility is that longer terms enhance the incentives of legislators because e¤ort decisions represent investments that are slow to pay o¤. But another, perhaps more mechanical explanation is that legislators on a shorter track spend part of their time o¢ ce worrying about their reelection campaign.
Our data does not lend support for the idea that campaigning drives results, while largely supporting the idea that time horizons matter to legislators. Overall, our results support the idea that even when the accountability logic highlighted by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) may be important, in the context we study political incentives seem to be strongly a¤ected by an investment logic.
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